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ABSTRACT
The recent advances of web-based cryptomining libraries
along with the whopping market value of cryptocoins have
convinced an increasing number of publishers to switch to
web mining as a source of monetization for their websites.
The conditions could not be better nowadays: the inevitable
arms race between adblockers and advertisers is at its peak
with publishers caught in the crossfire. But, can cryptomin-
ing be the next primary monetization model in the post
advertising era of free Internet?
In this paper, we respond to this exact question. In partic-
ular, we compare the profitability of cryptomining and ad-
vertising to assess the most advantageous option for a con-
tent provider. In addition, we measure the costs imposed to
the user in each case with regards to power consumption, re-
sources utilization, network traffic, device temperature and
user experience. Our results show that cryptomining can
surpass the profitability of advertising under specific circum-
stances, however users need to sustain a significant cost on
their devices.
Keywords
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ing, Cryptocurrency, Cryptojacking
1. INTRODUCTION
Digital advertising is today the dominant monetiza-
tion model for web publishers. During the last decade,
it has become the driving force of the web, leading to the
provision and support of new web services and applica-
tions [37, 93]. Indicatively, digital advertising, which
is continuously growing with an unprecedented rate,
reached total revenues of $209 billion in 2017 [47].
However, in the recent years, either due to the roaring
privacy implications of targeted advertising [15, 79, 94]
or the irritation dodgy ads may cause [39], a growing
number of users (615 million devices – 30% growth since
last year [25]) decided to abdicate from receiving ads by
adopting all-out approaches (like deploying ad-blocking
mechanisms [18, 71, 100] or ad-stripping browsers [14,
19, 35]). This increasing ad-blocking trend made some
major web publishers, after seeing their income to sig-
nificantly shrink (total losses of $22 billion [61]), to
deploy ad-blocker detection techniques [45, 60, 67] and
deny serving content to ad-blocking users [23,58,86,88].
Such aggressive actions from both sides escalated an in-
evitable arms race between the ad-ecosystem on the one
side, and the ad-blockers and privacy advocates on the
other side [11,62,67].
It is of no doubt that in such a dispute, publishers
were trapped in the crossfire being unable to effectively
monetize their services. To that end, it did not take long
for some of them to look for effective and reliable alter-
native schemes to support their websites. Some of these
schemes include paid website versions, user compensa-
tion (e.g., Basic Attention Token [7]) and cryptomining.
Especially the latter, given its privacy protecting nature
(no user tracking and personal data collection required,
thus making cryptocurrency mining GDPR compliant)
and the frenetic increase of the market value of crypro-
coins, gains an ever increasing popularity.
Of course, in-browser based mining is not a new idea.
The compatibility of Javascript miners with all mod-
ern browsers gave motivation for web mining attempts
since the very early days of Bitcoin, back in 2011 [64].
To that end, web miners “borrow” spare CPU cycles of
the visiting users’ devices for performing their Proof-of-
Work (PoW) computations [87] for as long as the user is
browsing the website’s content. However, the increased
mining difficulty of Bitcoin was the primary factor that
led such approaches to failure. Yet, the rapid growth of
Bitcoin lured several initiatives to construct their own
derivatives (more than 1638 nowadays [44]) providing
specific extra features e.g., transaction speed, proof-of-
stake. One of the provided features: mining speed, be-
came the growth factor for some coins (Monero [22,82]
grew from 13$ to 300$ within 2017 [38]) and worked as
catalyst a for the incarnation of web cryptomining [50].
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Indeed, since the release of the first JavaScript miner
(i.e., September 2017) by Coinhive [20], we observe a
rapidly increasing [3,29,32] number of content providers
deploying web-based cryptomining libraries in their web-
sites, monetizing their content either by using both ads
and web-mining or by fully replacing ads (e.g. Pirate-
Bay [28]). So the important question that arises at this
point is the following: Can web-mining become the next
business model of the post ad-supported era of Internet?
There are numerous opinions about this subject [12,
49, 83], but it is apparent that in order to accurately
respond to such a question we first need to investigate
all aspects of both advertising and web-mining. These
aspects include, first of all, the profitability that cryp-
tominers provide to publishers and also the costs that
users have to sustain from the utilization of their re-
sources: let us not forget that the unsustainable costs [42,
72] of advertising made ad-blocking popular.
In this study, we aim to address exactly that; we con-
duct the first full-scale analysis of the profitability and
costs of web-mining, in an attempt to shed light in the
newly emerged technology of in-browser cryptomining
and explore if it can replace ads on the web. Specifically,
in this study we estimate the possible revenues for the
different monetization strategies: advertising and web-
mining, aiming to determine under what circumstances
a miner-supported website can surpass the profits from
digital advertising.
Additionally, we collect a large dataset of miner- and
ad- supported websites and by designing and develop-
ing WebTestbench, a sensor-based testbed, we measure
the resource utilization of both models in an attempt
to compare their imposed user-side costs. In particu-
lar, WebTestbench is capable of measuring (i) the uti-
lization of mining regarding system resources such as
CPU and main memory, (ii) the degradation of the user
experience due to the increased mining workload, (iii)
the energy consumption and how this affects battery-
operated devices (e.g., laptops, tablets, smartphones),
(iv) system temperature and how overheating affects
the user’s device and (v) network and how this can af-
fect a possible mobile dataplan.
To summarize, in this paper we make the following
contributions:
1. We conduct the first study on the profitability of
web-based cryptocurrency mining, questioning the
ability of mining to become a reliable monetization
method for future web services. Our results show
that for the average duration of a website visit,
ads are 5.5x more profitable than cryptomining.
However, a miner-supported website can produce
higher revenues if the visitor remains in the web-
site for longer than 5.3 minutes.
2. We design a methodology to assess the resource
utilization patterns of ad- and miner- supported
websites on the visitor’s device. We implement our
approach in WebTestbench framework and we in-
vestigate what costs these utilization patterns im-
pose on the visitor’s side with regards to the user
experience, the system’s temperature, and energy
consumption and battery autonomy.
3. We collect a large dataset of around 200K ad-
and miner-supported websites that include differ-
ent web-mining libraries and cryprocurrencies. We
use this dataset as input for the WebTestbench
framework and we compare the resource utiliza-
tion and costs of the two web monetization mod-
els. Our results show that while browsing a miner-
supported website, the visitor’s CPU gets utilized
59 times more than while visiting an ad-supported
website, thus increasing the temperature (52.8%)
and power consumption (2x) of her device.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Web-based cryptocurrency mining
Web-based mining is a method of cryptocurrency min-
ing that happens inside a browser, using a mining script
delivered through a website. The idea of in-browser
cryptocurrency mining gained popularity since the very
early days of cryptocurrency (i.e., Bitcoin), back in 2011.
Indeed, the popularity of web applications and the wide
compatibility of JavaScript based miners with all mod-
ern browsers and platforms drew the attention of the
developers of BitcoinPlus [64]. However, the increased
mining difficulty of Bitcoin not only made web-based
mining unprofitable but, practically, infeasible.
Few years later, the rise of alternative cryptocoins
(altcoins) that provide distributed mining, increased
mining speed and ASIC (Application-Specific Integrated
Circuit) resistance, made distributed CPU (i.e, x86,
x86-64, ARM) based mining effective [1,82], even when
using commodity hardware. As a consequence, all these
new altcoins, such as Electroneum, Sumokoin, Bytecoin
and Monero, not only revived the concept of in-browser
cryptomining but also opened new funding avenues for
web publishers.
The motivation behind this new business model is
simple: users visit a website and pay for the received
content indirectly by mining cryptocurrency coins, with-
out being polluted with (possibly annoying [39]) ads.
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Furthermore, publishers do not have to bother collect-
ing behavioral data, including trackers [2] or user finger-
printing libraries [66] to get higher prices [73] for their
ad-slots. As a consequence, users get a cleaner, faster,
and potentially less risky [89,102] website.
2.2 Monero crypto-coin
Monero, is the most popular altcoin for web-mining at
the moment, growing from 13$ to 300$ within 2017 [38].
It is based on the CryptoNight Proof-of-Work (PoW)
hash algorithm [27], which comes from the CryptoNote
protocol. The motivation behind the development of
Monero was to provide decentralization and privacy by
obscuring the sender, recipient and amount of every
transaction made. Although Monero is ASIC resistant,
and thus can be mined with both CPUs and GPUs, due
to the design restrictions of web browsers, all contem-
porary mining libraries are limited in CPU-only mining.
2.3 How does web mining work?
The large growth of web-based cryptocurrency min-
ing started with the release of Coinhive’s JavaScript im-
plementation of a Monero miner in September 2017 [20].
This JavaScript-based miner, which computes hashes as
a Proof-of-Work, could be easily included in any website
for enabling publishers to utilize visiting users’ CPUs as
a way to monetize the visits to their websites.
As a result, upon visiting a miner-supported website,
the user along with the website’s necessary content (i.e.,
HTML, JavaScript CSS) receives a mining library, too.
Usually these mining libraries are provided by third par-
ties, which we will refer to as Mining Service Providers
(MSP), who are responsible for maintaining the source
code, controlling the synchronization of computations,
collecting the computed hashes and sharing the profits
with the publishers.
Upon rendering, a miner establishes a persistent con-
nection using HTML5’s WebSocket API [55] with a re-
mote third-party server, which is typically operated by
the MSP (e.g., coinhive.com), in order to communicate
with the service/mining pool. Through this channel
the miner receives periodically proof-of-work tasks and
reports the successfully computed hashes.
Coinhive (like similar projects e.g., CryptoLoot, JSEc-
oin) leverage the capabilities of modern web browsers
and the advances of JavaScript in order to make effi-
cient mining through parallelization. Hence, these min-
ing libraries typically use multiple threads on the visi-
tor’s system, through the utilization of HTML5’s Web
Workers API [59]. Furthermore, apart from perform-
ing computations in multiple threads, the use of web
workers enables background processing. This way, the
heavy mining process running on the background does
not intervene with the core functionality of the web-
site, which can be rendered unhampered in the user’s
display. In addition, typically mining libraries include
code written in web assembly [98], for running all the
necessary complex mathematic functions nearly as fast
as native machine code.
2.4 Cryptojacking
Of course the increasing growth of web-based miners
does not create opportunities only for legitimate pub-
lishers, but cyber-attackers as well. Soon after the re-
lease of the first mining library from Coinhive in 2017,
numerous incidents have been reported [63] of attack-
ers injecting mining code snippets in websites with in-
creased audience. As a result, the browsers of unaware
visitors are forced to mine cryptocoins, thus abusing the
system’s resources. This so-called Drive-by Mining or
cryptojacking takes place either by compromising em-
bedded third party libraries or by delivering malicious
mining code through the ad ecosystem [40]. For exam-
ple, the compromisation of a single screen reader third
party (i.e., Browsealoud [70]) resulted in infecting more
than 4000 websites that were using it. Victims of cryp-
tojacking have been popular and prestigious websites
like the official webpage of Cristiano Ronaldo [51], the
websites of CBS Showtime [54] and PolitiFact [36], and
the UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office [52], Stu-
dent Loans Company and National Health Service web-
sites [41].
Of course, the notion of cryptojacking does not only
include compromised websites but also websites that
use web mining as a method for monetization but ab-
stain from informing the users about the existence of
cryptominers. Indeed, contrary to the digital advertis-
ing were visitors can identify (in most of the cases [57])
the ad-impressions, in web mining it is not easy for the
visitors to perceive the existence of an included miner.
Consequently, web cryptojacking is a malicious action
that abuses the user’s processing power and includes
any web-mining attempt without the user’s consent ir-
respectively whether the mining code has been legiti-
mately deployed by the publisher of the website or a
malicious actor that hijacked the website.
All the recently reported cases of cryptojacking, in-
evitably contributed towards giving a bad reputation to
a possibly viable monetization method for web publish-
ers. As a consequence, we see a mine blocking move-
ment rising, similar to the ad-blocking trend, where
blocking extensions following an all-out model, block
any detected mining library even if this requests the
permission of the user in order to start mining.
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Figure 1: Cryptomining market share per third
party library in our dataset. As seen, Coinhive
owns the dominant share (69%) when JSEcoin
follows with 13%.
3. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
In order to gather the necessary data for our study, we
first collect several coin-blocking blacklists [103] includ-
ing the ones used by the 5 most popular mine-blocking
browser plugins: Coin-Blocker [13], No Mining [68],
MinerBlock [10], noMiner [48] and CoinBlock [9]. By
merging these blacklists we compose a list that con-
tain 3610 unique entries of mining libraries and key-
words. Then we use each of these entries to query Pub-
licWWW’s [78] dataset of the top 3 million pre-crawled
landing pages, and we find 107511 mine-including do-
mains. It should be noted that the domains we collected
that perform mining, are ranked in the range from 1353
to 960540 in the Alexa rank of popular websites, and
that the majority of them are based in the USA, Russia
and Brazil.
The mining websites we collected, include more than
27 different third party miners, such as Coinhive1, Cryp-
toLoot2 and CoinHave3. In Figure 1, we present the
portion of websites in our dataset that use each one of
these third party mining libraries. As can be seen, be-
sides the large variety of mining libraries, there is a mo-
nopolistic phenomenon in the market of cryptominers,
with Coinhive owning the dominant share (69%), when
from the rest of its competitors only JSEcoin miner sur-
passing 10%. Furthermore, our dataset includes 2 dif-
ferent cryptocoins such as Monero [82] and JSECoin [6].
Apart from these miner-supported websites, we also
collected an equal number of ad-supported ones, which
1https://coinhive.com/
2https://crypto-loot.com/
3https://coin-have.com/
Type Amount
Blacklist entries 3610
Miner-supported websites 107511
Ad-supported websites 100000
Unique third-party miners 27
Crypto-coins Monero, JSEcoin
Table 1: Summary of our dataset
are among the same popularity ranking range. We pro-
cess each of these domains and by using the blacklist
of Ghostery open-source adblocker, we enumerated all
ad-slots in the landing page. The average number of ad-
slots per website was 3.4. Finally, Table 1 summarizes
the contents of our dataset.
3.1 WebTestbench framework for utilization
analysis
To measure the costs that each domain in our dataset
imposes on the user, we designed and developed WebTest-
bench: a web measuring testbed. A high-level overview
of the architecture of WebTestbench is presented in Fig-
ure 2. The WebTestbench framework follows an exten-
sible modular design, and consists of several measuring
components that work in a plug-and-play manner. Each
such plug-in component is able to monitor usage pat-
terns in different system resources (e.g., memory, CPU,
etc.). The main components of our platform, as can be
seen in Figure 2, currently include:
A. crawler component, which runs the browser (i.e.,
Google Chrome) in a headless mode. The crawling
is responsible of stopping and purging any state
after a website probe (e.g., set cookies, cache, lo-
cal storage, registered service workers, etc.), and
listening to the commands of the main controller
(i.e., next visiting website, time interval, etc.).
B. main controller, which takes as input a list of
domains and the visiting time per website. It is
responsible of scheduling the execution of the mon-
itoring components and the results printer.
C. monitoring platform, which is responsible for
the per time interval execution of the monitoring
modules. This platform was build in order to be
easily expandable in case of future additional mod-
ules.
D. results printer, that dumps in a local database
the monitoring results.
For the scope of this analysis, we developed 6 different
modules to measure the utilization that miners perform
in 6 different system resources:
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Figure 2: High level overview of our web
measuring testbed. A Chrome-based platform
fetches each website for a specific time when the
different components measure its resources for
behavioral analysis.
1. memory activity (physical and virtual), by using
the psrecord utility [80] and attaching to the crawl-
ing browser tab’s pid.
2. CPU utilization per core, by using the dedicated
linux tool process status (ps [90]).
3. system temperature (overall and per core), by lever-
aging the Linux monitoring sensors (lm sensors
[81]).
4. network traffic, by capturing (i) the network pack-
ets through tcpdump and (ii) the HTTP requests
in the application layer along with their metadata
(e.g., timing, initiator, transferred bytes, type, sta-
tus code), in pcap and HAR files respectively.
5. process interference, to infer the degradation of
user experience caused by the heavy CPU utiliza-
tion of mining processes. Specifically, this module
consists of a CPU intensive benchmarking that in-
cludes multi-threaded MD5 hash calculations.
6. energy consumption, by installing in our machine
an external Phidget21 power sensing package [75,
76]. Phidget enable us to accurately measure the
energy consumption of the 3 ATX power-supply
lines (+12.0a, +12.0b +5.0, +3.3 Volts). The 12.0
Va line powers the processor, the 5.0V line powers
the memory, and the 3.3V line powers the rest of
the peripherals on the motherboard.
The source code of WebTestbench along with the de-
veloped monitoring modules are provided open source4.
Methodology: In order to explore the different re-
source utilization patterns for miner- and ad- supported
websites, we load our domain dataset in WebTestbench
and we fetch each landing page for a certain amount
of time. During this period the network monitoring
module captures all outgoing HTTP(S) requests of the
analyzed website. Additionally, the modules responsi-
ble for measuring the energy consumption, the CPU
and memory utilization and the temperature report the
sensor values in a per second interval. By the end of this
first phase, WebTestbench erases any existing browser
state and re-fetches the same site. This time, the only
simultaneously running process is the interference mea-
suring module which reports its progress at the end of
the second phase.
4. ANALYSIS
In this section, we aim to explore the profitability
of the cryptomining web monetization model for the
publishers, and to compare it with the current domi-
nant monetization model of the web: digital advertis-
ing. Towards that direction, we assess the costs imposed
on the user side in an attempt to determine the over-
heads a website’s visitor sustains while visiting a miner-
supported website. For the following experiments, we
use a Linux desktop equipped with a Hyper-Threading
Quad-core Intel I7-3770 operating at 3.90 GHz, with 8
MB SmartCache, 8 GB RAM and an Intel 82567 1GbE
network interface.
4.1 Profitability of publishers
In the first set of experiments, we set out to explore
the profitability of cryptominers and compare it to the
current digital advertising model. Thereby, in the first
experiment we simulate the monthly profit of the two
strategies for a website of moderate popularity: 100,000
visitors/month. Studies [65] have measured the aver-
age duration of a website visit being around 1 minute.
For this experiment, we use the popular Monero min-
ing library of Coinhive which currently provides a rate
of 0.0001468/1M hashes. This means that the pub-
lisher gets 0.0001468 Monero (XMR) (at the time of
the experiment: 1 Monero=205 USD) per 1 million suc-
cessfully calculated hashes. Apart from the visit dura-
tion, the amount of total calculated hashes of a pub-
lisher depends on the computation power of the vis-
itors’ devices. Thus, in this experiment, in order to
cover a wider range of CPU hashrate capabilities [26],
4WebTestbench source: https://github.com/panpap/
webTestbench
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Figure 3: Estimation of monthly profit for the
different monetization methods for a website
with 100K visitors and average visit duration
of 1 minute. Even for visitors with powerful
devices (300Hashes/sec), a publisher gains 5.5×
more revenue by including 3 ads in its website.
we use 4 different levels of computation rates (Dual-core
(3.50GHz) with Hyper-Threading: 50 Hash/sec, Quad-
core (3.30GHz): 100 Hash/sec, Quad-core (4.00GHz)
with Hyper-Threading: 200 Hash/sec and Octa-core
(4.3GHz) 300 Hash/sec).
Apart from the profit from cryptomining, in this ex-
periment we also compute the monthly revenue of the
same website in the case of following the traditional
advertising model. The most popular medium for per-
sonalized ad-buying nowadays [31, 91] is the program-
matic instantaneous auctions. In this model, advertis-
ers bid in real time auctions for each available ad-slot of
a publisher’s inventory based on how well the visitor’s
interests match their advertised product. As described
in Section 3, the average number of ad-slots in an ad-
supported website is 3 and the median charge price per
ad impression as measured in previous studies [73] is 1
CPM. As can be seen in Figure 3, for the average dura-
tion of a user’s visit, the publisher even when achieving
an average computation rate from visitors of as high
as 300Hash/sec, gains 5.5x more revenue when using
ads instead of cryptomining. Our simulation results are
verified by the real world experiment of M. Cornet [24].
It is apparent thus, that even with visitors equipped
with powerful devices, time matters for a miner-supported
website. Indeed, recent studies [3] show that the ma-
jority of miner-supported websites provide content that
can keep the visitor on the website for a long time. Such
content includes TV, video or movie streaming, flash
games, etc. Of course in cryptomining, the user does
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Figure 4: Revenue per visitor for a website run-
ning in a background tab. In order for a pub-
lisher to gain higher profit from mining than us-
ing ads (3 ad-slots), a visitor must keep his tab
open for duration > 5.3 minutes (depending on
the their device).
not need to interact with the website’s content per se.
As a consequence, there are numerous deceiving meth-
ods (e.g., pop-unders [92]) currently in use, aiming to
allow the embedded miner to work in the background
for as long as possible.
In the next experiment, we set out to identify the
minimum time the publisher’s website needs to remain
open in the background in a visitor’s browser tab in
order to gain profit higher than when using ads. In
Figure 4 we simulate the revenue per visitor for a web-
site running in the background and we use the same
hash-rate levels as above. As shown, the miner-using
publisher, in order to produce revenues higher than
when ads are delivered, must keep its website open in
a user’s browser for duration longer than 5.3 minutes
in the case of a user equipped with a high performance
device (300Hash/sec), or longer than 33,1 minutes in
case of a low performance device of 50Hash/sec!
4.2 Costs imposed on the user side
After estimating the revenues of a publisher for the
different monetization methods, it is time to measure
the costs each of this method imposes on the user.
4.2.1 CPU and Memory Utilization
In the first set of experiments, we explore the aver-
age CPU and memory utilization of mining supported
websites. Note at this point, that the intense of min-
ing is tunable. The majority of mining libraries allow
the publishers to fine tune the number of threads and
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Figure 5: Distribution of average real and vir-
tual memory utilization through time. Miner-
supported websites although reserve (3.59x)
larger chunks of virtual memory, require 1.7x
more MBytes of real memory than ad-supported
websites.
the throttling of their included miner. In this exper-
iment we fetch each website in our two subsets for 3
minutes using WebTestbench and we extract the distri-
bution of its CPU utilization through time. In Table 2
we report the average values for the median, the 10th
and 90th percentiles. As we see, the median miner-
supported website utilizes the visitor’s CPU up to 59
times more than an ad-supported website.
In the same way, we measure the utilization of the
visitors main memory and in Figure 5 we plot the av-
erage values for both real and virtual memory activity.
As expected, miners do not utilize memory as heavy as
CPU. In particular, we see that on average the miner-
supported websites require 1.7x more space in real mem-
ory than the ad-supported websites.
4.2.2 Network Activity
Next, we measure the network utilization of the av-
erage mining-supported website. As discussed in Sec-
tion 2, a mining library needs to periodically communi-
Type 10th Perc. Median 90th Perc.
Advertising 3.33% 9.71% 17.19%
Mining 560.11% 574.01% 580.71%
Table 2: Distribution of the average CPU Uti-
lization for the different monetization methods.
The median miner-supported website utilizes
59x more the user’s CPU than the median ad-
supported website.
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Figure 6: Distribution of the total transmitted
volume of bytes per website for a visit duration
of 3 minutes. The median miner-generated traf-
fic volume is 3.4x larger than the median ad-
generated. In 20% of the websites the difference
reduces significantly (less than 2x).
cate with a remote third party server (i.e., the MSP’s
server) in order to report the calculated hashes but also
to obtain the next PoW. This communication in the
vast majority of the libraries in our dataset takes place
through a special persistent channel that allows bidirec-
tional communication. To assess the network activity
of web miners, we use the network capturing module of
WebTestbench and we monitor the traffic of each (ad-
and miner-supported) website for 3 minutes.
Based on the detected third-party mining library, we
isolate the web socket communication between its in-
browser mining module and the remote MSP server. In
order to compare this PoW-related communication of
miners with the corresponding ad-related traffic of ad-
supported websites, we utilize the open-source blacklist
of the Disconnect browser extension5 to isolate all ad-
vertising related content. In Figure 6, we plot the dis-
tribution of the total transmitted volume of bytes per
website for the visit duration of 3 minutes. Although
the web socket communication of miners consists of
small packets of 186 Bytes on average, we see that in
total the median PoW-related communication of miner-
supported websites transmitted 22.8 KBytes, when the
median ad-traffic volume of ad-supported websites was
6.7 KBytes. This means that the median miner-generated
traffic volume is 3.4x larger than the median ad-generated.
In this experiment, we see that the network utilization
patterns depend not only on the throttling of the miner
but also on the different implementations. For exam-
5Disconnect: https://disconnect.me/
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Component Type 10th Percentile Median 90th Percentile
CPU & Network adapter
Advertising 31.88 Watt 32.39 Watt 34.17 Watt
Mining 63.35 Watt 67.60 Watt 71.22 Watt
Main Memory
Advertising 4.37 Watt 4.46 Watt 5.35 Watt
Mining 4.76 Watt 4.99 Watt 5.67 Watt
Table 3: Distribution of the average consumption of power for the different monetization methods.
The median miner-supported website forces the user’s device to consume more power than the
median ad-supported website: 2.08x and 1.14x more power for the CPU and the memory component,
respectively.
ple, while using the same portion of CPU, the miner
of coinhive.com transmits on average 0.6 packets/sec,
webmine.cz: 2.2 packets/sec, cryptoloot.com: 4.7 pack-
ets/sec and jsecoin.com: 1.3 packets/sec.
In Figure 7 we plot the distribution of the average
data transfer rate per miner-supported website in our
dataset. As shown, the median communication between
the miner and the MSP has a transfer rate of 1 Kbit per
second (or 146 Bytes/sec). As in the previous experi-
ment, the rate highly depends on the mining library,
with some of them reaching up to 14 Kbit per second.
At this point, recall that the PoW-related communica-
tion between the in-browser miner and the MSP holds
for as long as the miner is running, and as we saw in
Figure 4 a miner must run for longer than 5.3 minutes
in order to produce revenues higher than ads. This
means that for the median case, the total volume of
bytes transferred will exceed 46 KBytes.
In the case of a user that browses through a cellular
(4G) network6, the monetary cost imposed is 0.000219$
per minute on average, while browsing a miner-supported
website. On the other hand, a publisher including a
coinhive miner in its website from the same user earns
0.000409$ per minute (considering that the user pro-
vides an average hash rate of 227Hash/sec as in [24]).
Hence, we see that cellular users, among other costs
while visiting miner-related websites, pay a monetiza-
tion cost that is only 53% less than the revenue of the
publisher.
4.2.3 Power Efficiency
Of course the intensive resource utilization of cryp-
tominers affects also the power consumption of the visi-
tor’s device, which has a direct impact on its battery au-
tonomy. In the next experiment, we measure the power
consumed by (i) main memory and (ii) CPU and net-
work adapter components of the user’s device while vis-
iting miner- and ad- supported websites for a 3 minute
duration. In Table 3, we report the average median,
6Considering the average prices per byte in USA and Eu-
rope [5, 34,99]
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Figure 7: Distribution of the transmitted bit
rate per miner-supported website in our dataset.
The median in-browser miner communicates
with its remote MSP by transmitting 1.168 bits
per second.
10th and 90th percentile values for all websites in our
dataset. As we can see, there is a slightly increased
(1.14x more than ad-supported websites) consumption
of the memory component in miner-supported websites.
However, we see that the heavy computation load of
cryptominers significantly increases the CPUs and net-
work adapters consumption, making miner-supported
websites consume 2.08x more energy than ad-supported
websites! This means that a laptop able to support 7
hours of consecutive traditional ad supported browsing,
would support 3.36 hours of mining-supported brows-
ing.
4.2.4 System Temperature
The increased electricity powering of the visitor’s sys-
tem results to an increased thermal radiation. During
the above experiment, we measure the distribution of
the per-core temperatures while visiting each website
in our dataset for 3 minutes. In Figure 8 we present the
average results for the percentiles: 10th, 25th, 50th,
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Figure 8: Distribution of average temperatures
per system’s core. When the visited website in-
cludes miner, the average temperature of the
cores may reach up to 52.8% higher (73 − 77◦
Celsius) than when with ads.
75th, 90th. As we can observe, the core temperatures
for miner-supported websites are constantly above the
optimal range of 45−60◦ Celsius [53,77]. In particular,
the visitor’s system operates for most of the time in the
range of 43 − 50◦ Celsius while visiting ad-supported
websites. When the visited website includes miner, the
average temperature of the cores reaches up to 52.8%
higher, in the range of 73−77◦ Celsius, when in 10% of
the cases it may reach higher than 84◦ Celsius.
To that end, with regards to the costs imposed to
the user, high temperatures may lead to degraded sys-
tem performance and poor user experience. Apart from
that, constantly running a commodity device (such as a
mobile phone, laptop or desktop PC) at high tempera-
tures, without a proper cooling mechanism, may signifi-
cantly decrease the hardware’s lifespan in the long term
or even cause physical damage by thermal expansion.
4.2.5 Effects on Parallel Running Applications
It is apparent that the heavy utilization of the visi-
tor’s CPU is capable of affecting the overall user’s ex-
perience not only in the visited website, but in par-
allel processes and browser tabs, too. Indeed, for as
long as the browser tab of a mining-supported website
is open, the multi-threaded computations of the embed-
ded miner leaves limited processing power for the rest
of the running applications. To make matters worse, as
part of a PC’s own cooling system, the motherboard in
case of increased temperatures may instruct the CPU
component to slow down (in the case of overheating,
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Figure 9: Impact of background running miner-
and ad-supported websites to a user’s process.
When the majority of ad-supported websites
have negligible effect in other processes, the me-
dian embedded miner in our dataset through its
heavy CPU utilization may cause a performance
degradation of higher than 46% to a parallel run-
ning process.
motherboard may force the whole system to turn off
without warning) [8].
To assess how these factors may affect parallel run-
ning processes in the visitor’s device, in the next ex-
periment, we use the interference measuring module of
WebTestbench and we measure the performance over-
head caused by background running miners. This mod-
ule, introduces computation workloads to the system to
emulate a parallel running process of the user. Specifi-
cally, WebTestbench fetches each website in our dataset
for the average visit duration (i.e., 1 minute), in paral-
lel conducts multi-threaded MD5 hash calculations, and
in the end reports the number of successful calculated
hashes. In order to test the performance of the user’s
parallel process in different computation intensity lev-
els, we visit each website using 3 setups for the MD5
process, utilizing in parallel 1, 2, and 4 cores of the
CPU. In addition, we run the MD5 process alone for 1
minute to measure the maximum completed operations.
In Figure 9, we plot the distribution of the portion of
completed operations per website. As expected, we can
clearly observe that when there is a miner-supported
website running in the user’s browser, the performance
of the user’s processes that run in parallel is severely
affected. In particular, we see that the median miner-
supported website forces the parallel process (depend-
ing on its computation intensity) to run in 54%, 50% or
even 43% of its optimal performance, thus causing an
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overall performance degradation that ranges from 46%
to 57%! Additionally, we see a 39% of miners greed-
ily utilizing all the system’s CPU resources causing a
performance reduction of 67% to the parallel process.
Moreover, in this figure we plot the interference that
ad-supported websites impose to a parallel process. As
expected, the impact is minimal and practically only
processes with full CPU utilization are affected, facing a
performance degradation of less than 10% for the major-
ity of such websites. This slight performance degrada-
tion is caused by the JavaScript code responsible for ad
serving, user tracking, analytics, etc., deprives schedul-
ing time quantums from the parallel process.
It is of no doubt, that such severe performance degra-
dation when the user is visiting a mining-supported
website can cause glitches, or even crushes in other, par-
allel, CPU utilizing applications (like movie playback,
video calling, file compression, video games, etc.), thus
ravaging the user’s experience. Of course, this perfor-
mance degradation does not only affect parallel running
applications of the user but also mining operations from
other open browsing tabs.
Indeed, a miner can achieve full utilization when the
user has visited the miner-supported website1. How-
ever, when the user opens a second miner-supported
website2 the maximum utilization for both, as well as
the revenues for publisher1 and publisher2, drop to a
half. It is easy thus to anticipate, that the scalability
of cryptomining is limited since the more web-
sites rely on web-mining for funding, the less
revenues will be for their publishers. While this
monetization model has that apparent drawback, in dig-
ital advertising each ad-supported website is totally in-
dependent from any parallel open browser tabs.
5. DISCUSSION
5.1 User awareness
The lack of adequate policies and directives regard-
ing the proper use of cryptomining, has raised a big
controversy regarding the lack of transparency in miner-
supported websites. Many miner-supported websites do
not inform the user about the existence of a miner, nei-
ther ask for the visitor’s consent to utilize their system’s
resources for cryptocurrency mining.
In one of the first law cases about web-based cryp-
tocurrency mining, the Attorney General John J. Hoff-
man stated that “no website should tap into a person’s
computer processing power without clearly notifying the
person and giving them the chance to opt out” [46]. As
a consequence, whenever a user visits a website and she
is not aware about the background web-mining proce-
dure, irrespectively whether the mining code has been
legitimately deployed by the publisher or a malicious
actor that hijacked the website, this is considered as a
cryptojacking attempt.
5.2 Web-miner detection
The emergence of web-mining, and especially the many
reported cases of cryptojacking, pushed towards con-
sidering web-mining by default as a malicious opera-
tion. To that regard, many major Antivirus vendors
consider web-mining as potential malware, and recently
launched software products [4, 74] and browser exten-
sions, such as NoCoin and minerBlock [95] for detect-
ing and blocking in-browser miners. The vast majority
of these approaches are mainly based on detecting out-
going requests to third parties that provide JavaScript
mining APIs (e.g., Coinhive) and mining pools.
Moreover, most major browser vendors have started
incorporating detections mechanisms to prevent the web-
mining. Opera has incorporated NoCoin in its built-
in ad blocker mechanism to detect and block mining
scripts [56], and recently also incorporated this feature
to the mobile versions of its browsers [96]. Chrome and
Firefox are moving towards that direction, with the
former removing from the Chrome Web Store all ex-
tensions that perform mining [97] and implementing a
throttling mechanism that will limit CPU utilization for
JavaScript code running in the background [17]. Simi-
larly, Firefox is investigating mechanisms for throttling
background JavaScript execution [16].
However, even though these approaches currently seem
to manage reducing the extend of web-mining and cryp-
tojacking, they are not very robust against determined
publishers/attackers, especially the ones based on the
use of blacklists for detecting domains associated to
miners. Recently we have seen miners that try to avoid
detection by only utilizing a percentage of the users’
CPU processing power and by employing cloud-based
proxy servers to handle all communication with the
MSP’s server [84]. Also, in many cases the mining code
is highly obfuscated [85] to prevent pattern matching
tools from detecting snippets of such suspicious code.
5.3 User consent
In order to avoid criticism, and also avoid being blocked
by Antivirus and mining blocking tools, Coinhive, which
is promoted as a service that enables publishers to mon-
etize their websites in a legitimate and clean way, pro-
vided the“AuthedMine” JavaScript mining implemen-
tation. This new mining service requires user’s explicit
consent to start running mining while visiting the web-
site [21]. Essentially, this approach shows an attempt
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towards fighting cryptojacking and “legitimizing” Coin-
hive’s mining service, as it prevents in-browser mining
without the user’s knowledge and consent.
Even though this approach is a step towards the right
direction, it does not solve the problem of cryptojack-
ing in its entirety. New mechanisms need to be designed
and implemented by the browser vendors for detecting
the existence of mining scripts, even if they are obfus-
cated, and informing the users about them. The provi-
sion of such efficient mechanisms, and the willingness of
publishers to only adopt legitimate mining services that
inform the user and require her consent for performing
mining, can signal the emergence of a new monetization
paradigm in the web.
5.4 Letting the users choose
Since both digital advertising and web-mining impose
a hidden cost on the user, each one in a different way, a
new paradigm could be to inform the user about these
costs in each case and give them the option to choose
which of the two monetization schemes is more suitable
for them. In the case of advertising the main cost to
the user is related to the lack of privacy, while the cost
of web-based mining is associated with higher energy
consumption (and battery drainage, device overheating
etc). It seems that a viable option for web publishers
would be to inform the users about these costs, and pro-
vide two different versions of their website (i.e., one that
serve ads and one that uses cryptoming), thus allowing
the user to choose between the two schemes.
6. RELATED WORK
The advances of JavaScript, which provide developers
with parallel execution of their operations, and the de-
velopment of more lightweight altcoins like Monero and
Litecoin, enabled browser-based miners to grow. As a
result, content providers can deploy miner-supported
websites without affecting the user experience.
Eskandari et al. [32], in one of the first web mining
related studies, analyzes the existing in-browser mining
approaches and their profitability. In particular, the
authors measured the growth of cryptomining during
the last years by looking for mining libraries in Internet
archive services. In addition, they collected a set 33K
websites by querying for popular mining projects the
Censys.io BigQuery dataset, and they studied the CPU
utilization of the included miners.
AdGuard Research, which produces an ad-blocking
software, in [3] analyze the Alexa top 100,000 websites
for cryptocurrency mining scripts in an attempt to mea-
sure the adoption of cryptominers in the web. The anal-
ysis revealed 220 of these websites using crypto-mining
scripts with their aggregated audience being around 500
million people. The content of these hosting websites
were usually content that could keep the user on the
website for long and specifically movie/video/tv stream-
ing (22.27%), file sharing (17.73%), Adult (10%) and
News & Media (7.73%) with the majority of them based
in the U.S., India, Russia, and Brazil.
This rapid growth of web miners along with the frenzy
increase of the cryptocurrency values, caused a serious
debate over the Internet regarding the ability of cryp-
tomining to become an alternative to the current ad-
supported model of Internet [12,83]. In accordance with
this debate, in this study, we compare the profitabil-
ity of ad and cryptomining supported Internet services,
and we also measure the cost of cryptomining for the
visitors. Of course, the advertising ecosystem also im-
poses costs on the user side. Gui et al. in [42] measure
the cost of mobile advertisements to the mobile appli-
cation developer by performing an empirical analysis of
21 apps. The authors consider several types of costs: (i)
app performance, (ii) energy consumption, (iii) network
usage, (iv) maintenance effort for ad-related code and
(v) the users’ feedback from app reviews. Their results
show that apps with ads consume on average 48% more
CPU time, 16% more energy and 79% more network
data. In addition, they found that the presence of ads
in the apps affected the users’ overall opinion leading to
reduced ratings for the app.
Papadopoulos et al. in [72], analyze a year-long dataset
with weblogs of volunteering users in an attempt to
measure hidden costs of personalized advertising like
the imposed monetary cost and privacy loss. Authors
compare their findings with the cost paid by the adver-
tisers to deliver their impressions, and show that users
pay 3× more money to receive ads than what advertis-
ers pay to deliver them. In addition, the authors used
the leaked cookies from Cookie Synchronization to mea-
sure the anonymity loss of users. Results show that a
handful of third parties can learn up to 10% of the total
unique userIDs of the median user across an entire year.
At the beginning, cryptomining was used mostly by
shady websites that could not find proper revenue from
digital advertising or illegally as a payload of malwares.
Indeed, Wyke [101], back in 2012, attempted to increase
the awareness regarding the possibility of existing mal-
wares delivering cryptomining payloads to infect user
devices. Botnets are examples of such malwares, which
adopted mining to directly monetize the computational
ability of a compromised computer. Huang et al. [43]
conducts a comprehensive study of existing Bitcoin min-
ing malware, and presents the infrastructure and miner-
bot orchestration mechanisms deployed in the wild.
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The same advancements of contemporary browsers
that boosted the growth of cryptomining as a model
of web monetization, enabled also attackers to perform
cryptojacking. Recent reports from cybersecurity agen-
cies [33] aim to warn users about the emerging threat
of cryptojacking. Indeed, there are numerous incidents
already reported, where websites [51, 54] got infected
(either though malvertising [89] or server compromisa-
tion) with mining malware that abused visitors’ devices.
Dorsey, in [30], demonstrated his approach where by ex-
ploiting the ad ecosystem could widely deliver malware,
which upon browser infection, could perform malicious
computations like cryptomining on the user side.
7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Binded with the whopping values of cryptocoins, web-
based cryptomining enjoys nowadays a steadily increas-
ing adoption by service providers. More and more pub-
lishers choose web-miningfor monetizing their websites
in an attempt to abandon the sinking boat of digital
advertising. But can cryptomining become a reliable
alternative for the next day of the free Internet?
To respond to this exact question, in this paper we
estimate the monthly revenue a publisher may gain by
using cryptominers to monetize its content, and we com-
pare our results with the estimated revenue for the same
publisher when using the traditional personalized ad-
vertising model. Then we compute the duration thresh-
old for a website visit, after which a publisher can earn
more revenue when using a cryptominer instead of ads.
After exploring the profitability for the side of the
publisher, we measure the costs cryptominers impose
on the side of the user. Specifically, we analyzed the
utilization patterns of miner-supported websites in the
visitor’s system resources like CPU, main memory and
network. Then, we study the impact of these utiliza-
tion patterns (i) on the visitor’s device by measuring
the system’s power consumption and temperature, and
also (ii) on the visitor’s experience while running other
applications in parallel.
7.1 Lessons Learned
The findings of our analysis can be summarized as
follows:
• for the average duration of a website visit, a pub-
lisher gains 5.5x more revenue by including 3 ad
impressions in its website than by including a cryp-
tominer.
• to produce higher revenues with a miner than with
ads, user must keep her browser tab open on the
background for duration longer than 5.3 minutes.
• the median miner-supported website utilizes up to
59x more the visitor’s CPU and require 1.7x more
space in real memory than ad-supported websites.
• the transfer rate of the median miner-MSP com-
munication is 1 Kbit per second. For a user over
cellular network the monetary cost imposed is on
average 0.000219$ per minute, when the publisher
from the same user earns 0.000409$ per minute.
• the median miner-generated traffic volume is 3.4x
larger than the corresponding ad-generated.
• a visit to a miner-supported website consumes on
average 2.08x more energy than a visit to an ad-
supported website.
• a visitor’s system while visiting a miner-supported
website operates in up to 52.8% higher tempera-
tures than while visiting a website with ads.
• web-miners severely affect parallel running pro-
cesses. The median miner-supported website when
running in the background may degrade even 57%
the performance of parallel running applications,
thus wrecking the user experience.
7.2 Can cryptomining become the next
monetization model for the web?
After completing our analysis, we are now ready to
respond to our motivating question regarding the abil-
ity of cryptomining to become the next primary mon-
etization model for the web. Cryptomining can indeed
constitute a reliable source of income for specific cate-
gories of publishers, who can even increase their prof-
its by providing content (movie/video streaming, flash
games, etc.) that can keep the user on the website for
a relatively longer time (> 5.3 minutes).
What is more, in these days, where EU regulators [69]
aim to reform the way user data are being collected and
processed for targeted advertising, cryptomining pro-
vides a privacy-preserving monetization model that re-
quires zero data from the users. However, in this study
we see that the intensive resource utilization of current
cryptomining libraries, imposes a significant cost on the
user’s device, accelerating the deterioration of its hard-
ware. To make matters worse, this utilization also lim-
its the scalability of cryptomining, since the more web-
sites adopting miners the less portion of resources each
of them will acquire from a user with multiple open
tabs. To conclude, cryptomining indeed has the poten-
tial to become a reliable alternative for some content
providers, but it is not capable of replacing the current
ad-driven monetization model of the web.
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